美國公告中國2019軍力報告

逍遙侯

第5-7次提起
其實這三次的提起並不屬於真正的提及台灣
因為是這三次的出現是在於他們引用的資料裡面
該份資料為 2015年5月的中國軍事戰略摘錄裡面的內容
頁數是檔案的21頁 文件的第11頁


China's Military Strategy is directed primar-ily at an internal audience. Thus, it is repletewith party jargon, but it does contain the broadunderpinnings of China's military decision-making calculus. For example, Beijing  seesboth threats and opportunities emerging fromthe evolution of the international communitybeyond the U.S.-led unipolar framework towarda more integrated global environment shapedby major-power dynamics. Furthermore, Chinasees itself as an emerging major power that willbe able to gain influence as long as it can main-tain a stable periphery. As it emerges, Beijingwill use its growing power to shape the regionalenvironment in the face of interconnected threats while trying to avoid conflict over coreinterests: sovereignty, development, and unifi-cation. More specifically, China believes it mustplan to address the many threats to regionalstability because they are individually complexand at the same time contain a potential forexternal actors, most importantly the UnitedStates, to become involved. Nevertheless, Chinamust also look to safeguard its internationalinterests as they multiply and incur additionalthreats. Finally, as new threats emerge and asother militaries adjust their acquisition, strate-gies, and structure, China knows the PLA mustbe prepared to fight in new realms and adapt tothe modern, high-tech battlefield.

      With a generally favorable external environment, China will remain in an important periodof strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. Chi-na's comprehensive national strength, core competitiveness and risk -resistance capacity arenotably increasing, and China enjoys growing international standing and influence. Domes-tically, the Chinese people's standard of living has remarkably improved, and Chinese soci-ety remains stable. China, as a large developing country, still faces multiple and complexsecurity threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. Subsistence anddevelopment security concerns, as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats,are interwoven. Therefore, China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification,territorial integrity and development interests.

  The Taiwan issue bears on China's reunification and long-term development, and reunifi-cation is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross-Taiwan Strait relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, butthe root cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the "Taiwan independence' sep-aratist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development ofcross-strait relations. Further, China faces a formidable task to maintain political securityand social stability. Separatist forces for 'East Turkistan independence and Tibet indepen-dence' have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activitiesby East Turkistan independence forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up theirattempt to instigate a 'color revolution' in this country. Consequently, China faces more chal-lenges in terms of national security and social stability. With the growth of China's nationalinterests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, ter-rorism, piracy, serious natural disasters, and epidemics, and the security of overseas inter-ests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as wellas institutions, personnel, and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.

    The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range,precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasinglysophisticated. Outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights in strate-gic competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informa-tization. World major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies anddefense policies and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. Theaforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have notonly had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes but alsoposed new and severe challenges to China's military security.

      Excerpt from China's Military Strategy, May 2015

逍遙侯

再來是第8-10次

是位於 檔案43頁 資料33頁的
Power Projection and
Expeditionary Operations 章節內的內容

   Beijing's longstanding interest to eventu-ally compel Taiwan's reunification with themainland and deter any attempt by Taiwanto declare independence has served as theprimary driver for China's military modern-ization. Beijing's anticipation that foreignforces would intervene in a Taiwan scenarioled the PLA to develop a range of systems todeter and deny foreign regional force projec-tion. The implementation of Hu's New His-toric Missions in 2004 led to the incrementalexpansion of the military's modernization pri-orities to develop a PLA capable of operatingin new domains and at increasing distancesfrom the mainland. During this modernizationprocess, PLA ground, air, naval, and missileforces have become increasingly able to proj-ect power during peacetime and in the eventof regional conflicts. Beijing almost certainlywill use this growing ability to project power tobolster international perceptions of its role asa regional power and global stakeholder.


     Although Beijing states that its intent is toserve as a stabilizing force regionally, in prac-tice the PLA's aactions frequently result inincreased tensions. Since 2012, Beijing hasroutinely challenged Tokyo's Senkaku Islandclaims in the East China Sea. China's CoastGuard frequently conducts incursions into thecontiguous zone surrounding the islands tofurther China's elaims, while its Navy oper-ates around the claims to enforce administra-tion. The PLA has expanded and militarized China’s outposts in the South China Sea, and China’s Coast Guard, backed by the PLAN,commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnamese ships in the region.

Examples of incremental improvements toPLA power projection in the region are readilyfound in annual military exercises and opera-tions.6 For instance, in 2015 the PLA Air Force(PLAAF) carried out four exercise training mis-sions past the first. island chain through theBashi Channel, the northernmost passage ofthe Luzon Strait, and through the Miyako Straitcloser to Japan. The Miyako Strait flights were1,500 kilometers from Guam, within range ofthe PLAAFs CJ-20 air-launched land-attackcruise missile (LACM).61 Also in 2015, the PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-rangebomber, the PLAAF's first aircraft capable ofconducting strikes on Guam (with air-launchedLACMs like the CJ-20), past the first islandchain into the western Pacific.

China is also developing new capabilities thatwill enhance Beijing's ability to project power.In

September 2016, then-PLAAF CommanderGen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the firsttime that the PLAAF was developing a newlong-range bomber that would undoubtedlyexceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K.Although the H-6K recently began flying withLACMs, this Chinese-built airframe is the10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16, whichbegan flying in 1952.2 In 2016, China andUkraine agreed to restart production of theworld's largest transport aircraft, the An-225,which is capable of carrying a world-recordpayload of nearly 254 tons. China expects thefirst An-225 to be delivered and operational by2019.83 If used by the military, this capabilitywould facilitate the PLA's global reach.

   In addition to land-based aircraft, Chinais currently building its first domesticallydesigned and produced aircraft carrier.64 Theprimary purpose of this first domestic aircraftcarrier will be to serve a regional defense mis-sion. Beijing probably also will use the carrierto project power throughout the South ChinaSea and possibly into the Indian Ocean.65 Thecarrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018and is expected to enter into service by 2019.06[For more information on China's aircraft car-rier program, please see Appendix B.]

     Other areas that reflect China's growing mil-itary presence abroad include China's partici-pation in UN peacekeeping operations.7 Sep-arately, China routinely employs its modernhospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADRmissions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA con-ducted its first permissivenoncombatantevacuation operation, to extricate Chineseand other civilians from Yemen supported byYemeni security forces.

   China's efforts to enhance its presence abroad,such as establishing its first foreign militarybase in Djibouti and boosting economic con-nectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk RoadEconomic Belt and 2lst Century MaritimeRoad under the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), could enable the PLA to project power at even greater distances from the Chinesemainland.8,89.0 In 2017, China's leaders saidthat the BRI, which at first included economicinitiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, andEurope, now encompasses all regions of theworld, including the Arctic and Latin America,demonstrating the scope of Beijing's ambition.

Growing PLA mission areas and enhancedpresence abroad may lead to an increase indemand for the PLA to protect China's over-seas interests and provide support to Chinesepersonnel. China's increased presence alsointroduces the possibility that the PLA couldplay a more prominent role in delivering globalpublic goods in the future.


這個篇章 開頭就說明了
北京方面其實一開始就預設了外國勢力會干預台海問題
於是對於這些意料中的干預問題也採取了一系列的系統要應對
企圖以這種方式恫嚇外國勢力不得介入這個問題
後面則是敘述對於這些"應對系統"的實際作為
另外也介紹了不少中國目前的對於這個戰區所部屬的武器
有興趣的人可以看一看這段 大概就是敵我火力分析(?

逍遙侯

之後就跳到了檔案第73.74頁，也就是資料的第63.64頁

目前是第ˋ11.12.13次提起
出自於
APPENDIX B: PLA Navy 篇章內
因為是處至於同一個篇章 雖然頁數不同 但是我就合併一起張貼了

其實就是一個介紹中共海軍的附錄B
也就是上一個章節內一直提起的 B

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is Asia's largest navy,with an inventory of more than 300 surfacecombatants, submarines, amphibious ships,patrol craft, and specialized unit.201 ThePLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent, gen-erally single-purpose ships in favor of larger,multirole combatants with advanced antiship,antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sen-sors. This modernization aligns with China'sgrowing emphasis on the maritime domain,with increasing demands on the PLAN to con-duct operational tasks at increasing distancesfrom the Chinese mainland using multimis-sion, long-range, sustainable naval platformswith robust self-defense capabilities.202,203

In the 1980s, China's threat perceptions andgrowing economic interests drove a majorshift in the strategic orientation and utilityof navalforces. In particular, Chinese navalstrategists sought to expand the bounds oftheir maritime capabilities beyond coastaldefense. By 1987, PLAN Commander Adm LiuHuaqing had established a strategy referredto as offshore defense."204

     Although Liu characterized offshore areas aseast of Taiwan and the northern part of thePacific Ocean, stretching beyond the first islandchain, offshore defense was often associatedwith operations in the Yellow Sea, East ChinaSea, and South China Sea -China's near seas."Development of offshore defense paralleled theCMC's adoption of a new military strategythat focused on local wars on China's periph-  ery rather than a major confrontation withthe Soviet Union, and it focused on achievingregional goals and deterring a modern adver-sary from intervening in a regional conflict.

In line with the strategic requirement of off-shore waters defense and open- seas protec-tion, the PLAN will gradually shift its focusfrom offshore waters defense to the com-bination of offshore waters defense withopen-seas protection," and build a com-bined, multifunctional and efficient marinecombat force structure. The PLAN willenhance its capabilities for strategic deter-rence and counterattack, maritime maneu-vers, joint operations at sea, comprehensivedefense, and comprehensive support.

Excerpt from China's Military Strategy,      May 2015

Former President Hu and President Xi haverepeatedly emphasized the importance of mari-time power. In 2004, former President Hus out-line of the PLA's New Historic Missions encom-passed new expectations for the PLAN. In hisreport to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Hudeclared, We should enhance our capacity forexploiting marine resources, resolutely safe-guard China's maritime rights and interests,and build China into a maritime power." Hu'spublic emphasis on maritime power and theneed to resolutely safeguard China's mar-itime rights and interests reflect a growingconsensus in China that maritime power is essential to advancing China's interests. Thistrajectory was carried forward under Xi and isexplicit in China's 2015 military strategy:

The traditional mentality that land out-weighs sea must be abandoned, andgreat importance has to be attached tomanaging the seas and oceans and pro-tecting maritime rights and interests. Itis necessary for China to develop a mod-ern maritime military force structurecommensurate with its national securityand development interests, safeguard itsnational sovereignty and maritime rightsand interests, protect the security of stra-tegic SLOCs (sea lines of communication)and overseas interests, and participate ininternational maritime cooperation so asto provide strategic support for buildingitself into a maritime power.

Excerpt from China's Military Strategy, May 2015

In 2015, Beijing formally introduced a newnaval strategy, known as Offshore Defense andOpen Seas Protection. The new strategy con-tains the primary elements of offshore defensebut extends China's maritime sphere of opera-tions beyond the first and second island chainsand into the high seas in support of China'sgrowing international interests and maritimemissions. China relies heavily on maritimetrade, access to overseas energy resources, andoverseas employment of Chinese citizens topropel its domestic economy, spurring Beijing'sconcern for ensuring that the PLAN is capable  of pursuing open-seas protection missions. ThePLAN's acquisition patterns demonstrate agrowing emphasis on ships that are multimis-sion capable and large enough to sustain thesetypes of operations.

Roles and Missions(作用和任務)


Given China's heavy reliance on maritimecommerce, Beijing now has a vested interestin ensuring the security of international trade.Beijing also faces growing pressure to contrib-ute to international security missions. As anincreasingly modern and flexible force, thePLAN is at the forefront of addressing a num-ber of enduring Chinese security challenges,from reunification with Taiwan to assertingChina's maritime claims in the East and SouthChina Seas. Today the PLAN's primary opera-tional, training, and planning focus remains inthe near seas, where China faces sovereigntydisputes over various islands, maritime fea-tures, territorial waters, and associated mar-itime rights. The growth of China's diversifiednonwar missions, including HADR, SLOC .protection, and PKOs, has been a major driverof -and justification for China's expandednaval strategy and operations in the far seas.The following subsections highlight a few ofthese missions.

Countering Third-Party Intervention.Since the mid- 1990s, Chinese planners andstrategists have understood that the PLAN'sdevelopment of capabilities to deter, delay, andif necessary degrade third-party forces' inter-vention in a time of conflict is essential. Nearlytwo decades later, China has closed many of thegaps in key warfare areas, such as air defenseand long-range strike, that would support coun-tering third-party forces in regional campaigns.China has built or acquired a wide array ofadvanced platforms, including submarines, major surface combatants, missile patrol craft,maritime strike aircraft, and land-based sys-tems that employ new, sophisticated antishipcruise missiles and SAMs. China also has devel-oped the world's first roadmobile, antiship bal-listic missile, a system specifically designed toattack enemy aircraft carriers. Chinas leadershope that possessing these military capabilitieswill deter proindependence moves by Taiwanor, should deterrence fail, will permit a rangeof tailored military options against Taiwan andpotential third-party military intervention.





這個後面還有一點小細項 不過因為跟台灣問題比較沒關係 於是跳過不PO了

逍遙侯

之後跳到檔案79頁 也就是 69的部分

第二個小細項中有提起


      East Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Ningbo,the East Sea Fleet covers the majority of theEast China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. It fallsunder the PLA Eastern Theater Command'sarea of operations.

內容就是東海艦隊

簡單來說他不是提及台海問題 只是單純表示
台灣這個區域是由東海艦隊所負責的而他的總部設在寧波

逍遙侯

檔案P101,91頁
第16.17次

APPENDIX D: PLA Rocket Force

一樣是附錄的內容 這次是附錄D 講述的是解放軍的火箭部隊
在第四段的部分有提到台灣

    As part of military reforms initiated in late 2015,the PLA Second Artillery Force was renamedthe PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and for the firsttime the force was elevated to a full service onequal footing with the PLA Army, Navy, and AirForce. PLARF weapons systems include dozensof ICBMs and hundreds of theater-range mis-siles for precision strike against major adver-sary military and civilian infrastructure.-257


Roles and Missions

The PLARF operates Chinas strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missiles and isa critical component of Chinas deterrence strat-egy and efforts to counter third-party interven-tion in regional conflicts. The PLARF also ischarged with developing and testing severalnew classes and variants of long-range missiles,forming additional missile units, upgradingolder missile systems, and developing methodsto counter ballistic missile defenses.


Principal Weapon Systems

      The PLARF has about 1,200 short-range bal-listic missiles (SRBMs), and China is increas-ing the lethality of its conventional missileforce by fielding the CSS-11/DF-16 ballisticmissile, with a range of 800 to 1,000 kilome-ters. The CSS-11/DF-16, coupled with thealready deployed conventional land-attackand antiship variants of the CSS-5/DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), willimprove China's ability to strike not only Taiwan but other regional targets.

  The Rocket Force is fielding conventionalMRBMs to increase the range at which it canconduct precision strikes against land targetsand naval ships (including aircraft carriers)operating from China's shores out to the firstisland chain the islands running from theKurils, through Taiwan, to Borneo, roughlyencompassing the Yellow Sea, East ChinaSea, and South China Sea. The CSS-5 Mod-5/DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 kilome-ters and has a maneuverable warhead. Duringthe PLA's 90th anniversary parade in 2017,China displayed a new MRBM designatedthe DF-16G, which China claims featureshigh accuracy, short preparation time, and animproved maneuverable terminal stage thatcan better infiltrate missile defense systems.258


China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-rangeballistic missile (IRBM) during its September2015 military parade in Beijing. The DF-26 is .capable of conducting precision strikes againstground targets and contributes to China'scounterintervention posture in the Asia-Pa-cific region. During the parade, official publicstatements also referenced a nuclear versionof the DF-26, which, if it has the same guid-ance capabilities, would give China its firstnuclear precision-strike capability againsttheater targets.


The PLARF also continues . to enhance itsnuclear deterrent, maintaining  silo-basednuclear ICBMs and adding more survivable,mobile nuclear delivery systems. China cur-rently has 75 to 100 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2/DF-5A and MIRV-equippedCSS-4 Mod 3/DF-5B; the solid-fueled, road- mo-bile CSS- 10 Mod 1/DF-31 and CSS-10 Mod 21DF-31A; and the shorter range CSS-3/DF-4.The CSS-10 Mod 2/DF-31A has a range of morethan 11,200 kilometers and can reach mostlocations within the continental United States.China also is developing a new MIRV-capableroad- mobile ICBM, the CSS-X- 10/DF41.



      The CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile(GLCM) has a range in excess of 1 ,500 kilo-meters and offers flight profiles different fromballistic missiles, enhancing targeting options.Because of overlap in the kinds of targetsChina is likely to engage with either ballisticmissiles or. cruise missiles, GLCMs and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles providekey operational and planning flexibility. Theseweapons are likely to reduce the burden onballistic missile forces as well as create some-what safer strike opportunities for Chineseaircrews, allowing them to engage from muchgreater distances and from more advantageouslocations. This will complicate an adversary'sair and missile defense problem.


簡單來說 整篇大致上的意思就是表示
中共的火箭部隊目前射程覆蓋了 黃海 東海 跟南海
所以整個第一島鏈(包括台灣在內)都是他的射程範圍

除了介紹射程外 也介紹了這些火箭部隊所使用的武器類型跟性能

另外火箭部隊就是過去的二砲部隊 只是中共給他換了個新名字而已

逍遙侯

最後的一次

APPENDIX F: Chinese Intelligence Services

附錄F 中國情報局

    In June 2017, China passed a National Intel-ligence Law specifying that state intelligencework would fall under the central nationalsecurity leadership body," and military intel-ligence work would fall under the CentralMilitary Commission. 262 The central nationalsecurity leadership body may refer to an intel-ligence committee strueture subordinate toChina's Central National Security Commis-sion.263The PLA's national-level intelligencesystem is still undergoing changes as part ofbroader military reform efforts.


    Civilian Intelligence. The Ministry ofState Security (MSS) is China's main civil-ian intelligence and counterintelligence ser-vice.264 MSS missions include protecting Chi-na's national security, securing political andsocial stability, implementing the updatedState Security Law and related laws andregulations, protecting state secrets, andconducting counterintelligence.285

Domestic Security. The Ministry of PublicSecurity (MPS) is China's principal domesticsecurity agency and is responsible for over-seeing the country's domestic policing andpublic security activities. Although the MPSis not directly involved in domestic intelli-gence gathering, it has domestic intelligencefunctions, including investigating corruptioncases, countering threats to political andsocial stability, countering terrorism, andpolicing the Internet.2608,267


Political Work. The General Political Depart-ment Liaison Department, which probably wasrenamed the Political Work Department Liai-son Bureau (PWD/LB) during recent reforms, isthe PLA's principal organization responsible forpolitical warfare and for collecting and analyzingintelligence information regarding senior-levelofficers from the United States, Taiwan, Japan,and other defense establishments of interest.268260 The PWD/LB functions as an interlockingdirectorate that operates at the nexus of politics,finance, military operations, and intelligence.The PWD/LB has few analogous counterparts inmodern democratic societies. 270

Military Intelligence. The former PLA Sec-ond Department (2PLA) was a subdepart-ment of the GSD. Postreform, the 2PLA hasbeen identified as the Intelligence Bureau ofthe Joint Staff Department under the Cen-tral Military Commission.271 This bureaucarries out the military's overt reporting andclandestine human intelligence collectionoperations, provides indications and warningand other analysis to the CMC leadership,runs the defense attaché network, and man-ages intelligence produced by dedicated PLAreconnaissance assets,.2.273.274

    Signals Intelligence. The former PLA ThirdDepartment (3PLA) was one of the GSD'ssubdepartments but postreform has proba-bly been renamed and subordinated underthe SSF. This element controls a vast signalsintelligence (SIGINT) and computer network operations infrastructure. The PLA's SIGINTand cyber assets target foreign satellite, line ofsight, and over-the- horizon communications,as well as computer networks.276,276

Electronic Intelligence. The former PLAFourth Department (4PLA) was a subde-partment of the GSD, but postreform has probably been renamed and subordinated tothe SSF. This element is primarily respon-sible for offensive electronic warfare, but itis generally believed to maintain electronicintelligence capabilities.2277,278

逍遙侯

就這樣吧
整個檔案是140頁的PTF檔

扣除目錄一堆最後頁碼寫的是125
我是直接用搜尋的方式去閱讀的
簡單來說就是直接抓有台灣字眼的部分來看
該怎說 大概就是一個概念

台灣的敵人是大陸
但是大陸的敵人是美國
就這樣

鈕祜祿鬼隱

中國在南海填海造陸的環礁上，已建立起軍備精良的前哨基地。

台灣為什麼不做呢？